Jean-Pierre Cabestan: “Xi Jinping’s leeway is limited”
香港浸會大學 高敬文教授:「習近平的操舵角度其實有限。」
Professor at the Baptist University of Hong Kong, Jean-Pierre Cabestan is the author of Tomorrow’s China: Democracy or Dictatorship? (Gallimard, 2018).
高敬文 Jean-Pierre Cabestan 是浸會大學教授,為《明日中國:民主還是獨裁?》(Gallimard, 2018)的作者。
Le Figaro - Why are so many Hong Kongers against the extradition bill - which is currently suspended but not withdrawn?
費加洛報:為何這麼多香港人反對引渡法案?大家也知道現在已經被暫緩而不是撤回的。
Jean-Pierre Cabestan - If it were passed, people could be accused of political crimes and then be extradited to China. The risk to businessmen is also very important. Beijing could present accusations in front of Hong Kong courts based on proof given by Beijing that would be difficult to verify, and in the end, judges could only approve the requested extradition. But for protesters, this bill is above all the figurehead of a bigger
Chinese influence and a significant infringement on the rule of law.
高敬文:如果法案通過了,當局可以以政治理由拘捕港人,再引渡往中國,港商尤其受到威脅。北京可以拿出證據和指控出來要人,交給法庭卻難以核實,最後法官也只能准許引渡。而對於示威者來說,法案其實只是表象,人們反對的是中國日漸強化的對港影響力,和反抗顯注的法治侵害。[譯者按:「法治」或譯「以法制政」,以法律限制政權]
Is it because of naivety or intentional calculation that the chief executive, Carrie Lam, originally proposed this bill?
費:是因為天真還是老謀深算,所以行政長官林鄭月娥最初提出此法案?
It’s because of blindness. She quickly received Beijing’s support, who wanted to make sure that it was voted through as quickly as possible. But she certainly didn’t assess the opposition of Hong Kongers.
高:是因為盲目。她很早就洞識了北京的支持,要令法案在議會內盡早投票通過。但她絕對是沒有計量過香港人的反應。
Why is she refusing tooth and nail to formally withdraw the bill?
費:為什麼她斬釘截鐵地絕對不肯撤回修訂?
The decision to suspend it and not withdraw it was made by Beijing, who has the final word on this issue.
高:這是北京決定的:只可暫緩不可撤回,而北京當然是負責揸莊。
Are the police - accused of violence against protesters - following Beijing’s orders?
費:警察是服從北京指令的嗎?他們受到關於暴力的指控。
On paper, they obey Carrie Lam. But in reality, they follow instructions that come from Beijing’s Minister of Public Security, via the Liaison Office in Hong Kong. Beijing secretly added a certain number of police from the neighboring province of Guangdong to the [Hong Kong] police’s numbers (30,000 men in total), who evidently speak Cantonese like Hong Kongers and can blend in better. That’s what my sources tell me, and it’s a pretty serious development. In fact, Carrie Lam doesn’t have free rein over internal [national] security.
高:在文字上,他們服從於林鄭。但在現實上,他們是遵守北京公安部的指示,聽從中聯辦傳達的命令。北京也靜靜地在廣東和鄰近省份調撥了人手增援[香港]警隊([警隊]總人數約為三萬),廣東人能說廣東話,所以能裝扮成香港人。這是我的線眼告訴我的,這是很嚴重的發展。事實上,林鄭對於內部[國家]安全實在不能自由掌舵。
That’s a serious infringement of the “one country, two systems” formula.
費:這是對「一國兩制」的嚴酷毀壞。
Yes, and in theory, Beijing must only take care of foreign affairs and defense matters. But in reality, Beijing has recently been involving itself in the management of the territory’s security.
高:對。在理論上,北京只能處理國防和外交。但實際上,北京最近也開始了經營香港的安全事務。
The mafia also seems to have given Beijing a hand… Beijing is using “patriotic” elements - the triads - to scare young protesters. But it’s still risky for Beijing to continue down this road because reactions have been strong, and the triad-police collusion has basically been established.
(續)黑社會也在協助北京...北京利用「愛國」的元素去打壓年輕的示威者,就是用愛國的三合會。但北京繼續向這方向的風險也很大,因為大家的反應實在很強烈,警黑勾結這件事已經被廣泛認知。
Who are the protesters?
費:到底示威者是什麼人呢?
There are students, but more generally they are a youth that feels marginalized, worried about their future, and who have trouble housing themselves. There are also activists, citizens, political parties (the Civic Party, the Democratic Party…) and influential religious organizations - methodists, in particular. Everyone is motivated - beyond the extradition bill - by the gradual erosion of freedoms over the past three years. There were the five anti-communist bookshop owners who were kidnapped by Beijing, then the ban of the independence party, then the exclusion of parliament members who have expressed anti-China sentiments.
高:有些是學生,籠統地說他們是一些被邊緣化的人,擔心自己的前境、沒能安居樂業的年輕人。他們也是社運人士、公民、政黨(公民黨和民主黨等...)和一些有影響力的宗教團體,如循道宗。所有人都有動機和意識,是高於送中條例的,是指向近三年來對自由的加強打壓。已經有五位反對共產黨的書店店主被北京綁架,然後是禁絕了獨立黨[譯者按:應該是指「香港民族黨」],和將反對共產黨的立法會議員都排除出議會外[譯者按:簡稱DQ]。
Will universal suffrage be a demand made by the protesters from now on?
費:所以普選會否成為示威者的訴求?
Around July 1st, the movement evolved into a movement for the complete democratization of Hong Kong. It resumed what the “umbrella movement” started in 2014 that demanded universal suffrage but saw it rejected. It’s fairly audacious and idealist to believe that Beijing will go back on what it decided in 2014. I doubt that Xi Jinping will be ready to make these kinds of concessions.
高:在七月一日,運動已經進化成為要令香港完全民主化的抗爭運動,將2014年的「雨傘運動」鹹魚翻生、東山再起,當時要求的就是普選,但被中、港政府所拒絕了。想像北京會反悔一件自己在2014年決定了的事,這有點魯莽和理想論。我很質疑習近平會做這種讓步的可能性。
The democratic Hong Kong lawyer Martin Lee says that this is a “last chance fight”. Is this true?
費:香港的民主派律師李柱銘說這是「背水一戰」,你同意嗎?
Many Hong Kongers actually think that we must mobilize and come together, even without knowing how far Beijing will go. Two million Hong Kongers are asking for complete democratization of the territory! It’s a crisis in which we don’t know its end and we wonder how Beijing, how Carrie Lam, are going to get out of it.
高:很多香港人都認為我們所有人都應該動員和團結,就算不知道北京能去幾盡也好。兩百萬香港人要求香港完全民主化!這是一場危機,我們不知終點,我們也不知北京和林鄭能有什麼方法解困。
What is holding Beijing back from intervening with the military?
費:北京出軍隊的話,有什麼顧忌呢?
On the one hand, the credibility of the “one country, two systems” formula, and on the other, the social, political, and financial stability of Hong Kong. Xi Jinping’s leeway to do something is incredibly narrow. He’s required to play the game and doesn’t really have a choice. Imagine that Beijing intervenes and the day after tomorrow names a Communist Party secretary to manage Hong Kong! It would be chaos! The Chinese government knows very well that Hong Kong is anticommunist. Everyone will want to leave and there’ll even be “boat people”. In the 1980s and 1990s, Hong Kongers were described as greedy for money and indifferent to politics… Going back to China in 1997 politicized Hong Kongers, because China is led by a single and oppressive party. This proves that people can change, and it’s a lesson for Beijing. Because who tells us that the Chinese (mainlanders), today apolitical, can’t change in the same way as Hong Kongers have?
高:一方面,是「一國兩際」的這條方,另一方面香港在社會、政治和經濟幾方面的穩定。習近平操舵角度其實很窄,他是被迫進了場參與這局棋局。想像一下如果北京全面進場,然後後天派出一個黨委書記來管治香港!將會是亂上加亂!中國政府很清楚香港是反對共產主義的。所有人都會逃走,甚至是出現「船民」。在80和90年代,香港人大多只是說很貪錢和政治冷感...但在97回歸後,香港人都被政治化了:主因中國是一黨專政,而這黨是威壓的政黨。這證明了人民是能改變的,這是北京能學習的一件新事物。誰能肯定地說,中國人(大陸的)今日都政治冷感,不會有日像香港人這般地改變了?
原本法語訪問刊於《費加洛報》
Original French report was published in "Le Figaro"
http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/jean-pierre-cabestan-sur-hongkong-la-marge-de-manoeuvre-de-xi-jinping-est-etroite-20190804
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